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Abstract—This paper presents an analysis of data from a
gift-exchange-game experiment. The experiment was described in
‘The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity’ by Ga¨chter et
al. 2012. Since this paper uses state-of-art data science techniques,
the results provide a different point of view on the problem. As al-
ready shown in relevant literature from experimental economics,
human decisions deviate from rational payoff maximization. The
average gift rate was 31%. Gift rate was under no conditions
zero. Further, we derive some special findings and calculate their
significance.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not only the global financial crisis of the recent years
[1], which made economists reconsider the path economics
as a discipline should take. Since decades, it became obvious
that pure theories fail in real world [2]. Paul Krugman
described the current situation in economics as: ‘... the
central cause of the professions failure was the desire for an
all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also
gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical
prowess. Unfortunately, this romanticized and sanitized vision
of the economics led most economists to ignore all the things
that can go wrong. They turned a blind eye to the limitations
of human rationality’. The promising solution to that problem
– experimental economics – gained at importance. Human
subject research shifted economists’ point of view closer to
the psychologists’ one – people are no more considered to
be rational payoff maximizers. On the other side, growing
size and complexity of the data makes the application of
state-of-art data science essential.
Before vast data and computational power were available,
classical economists used game theory to predict outcomes of
human interactions. People were assumed to be intelligent and
autonomous, and to act pursuant to their existing preferences.
It is important to underline that game theory is a mathematical
discipline, whose task was never to define human preferences,
but to calculate based on their definition. A preference is an
order on outcomes of an interaction. One can be regarded
as rational, if one always makes decisions, whose execution
has referred to subjective estimation the most preferred
consequences [3], [4]. The level of intelligence determines the
correctness of subjective estimation. Beyond justifying own
decisions, rationality is a base for predictions of other people’s
decisions. If the concept of rationality is satisfied, and applied
mutually, and even recursively in a human interaction, then
the interaction is called strategic. Game is a notion for the
formal structure of a concrete strategic interaction [5].
A definition of a game consists of a number of players,
their preferences, their possible actions and the information
available for the actions. A payoff function can replace the
preferences under assumed payoff maximization. The payoff
function defines each player’s outcome depending on his
actions, other players’ actions and random events in the
environment. The game-theoretic solution of a game is a
prediction about the behavior of the players also known as an
equilibrium. The basis for an equilibrium is the assumption
of rationality. Deviating from an equilibrium is outside of
rationality, because it does not maximize the payoff according
to the formal definition. There are games, which have no
equilibria. At least one mixed strategies equilibrium is
guaranteed in finite games [6].
In common language, the notion of game is used for
board games or video games. In game-theoretic literature, it is
extended to all social, economical and pugnacious interactions
among humans. A war can be simplified as a board game.
Some board games were even developed to train people, like
Prussian army war game ‘Kriegspiel Chess’ [7] for their
officers. We like it to train in order to perform better in
games [8]. In most cases, common human behavior in games
deviates from game-theoretic predictions [9], [10]. One can
say without any doubt that if a human player is trained in a
concrete game, he will perform close to equilibrium. But, a
chess master is not necessarily a good poker player and vice
versa. On the other side, a game-theorist can find a way to
compute an equilibrium for a game, but it does not make a
successful player out of him. There are many games we can
play; for most of them, we are not trained. That is why it
is more important to investigate our behavior while playing
general games than playing a concrete game on expert level.
Although general human preferences are a subject of
philosophical discussions [11], game theory assumes that they
can be captured as required for modeling rationality. Regarding
people as rational agents is disputed at least in psychology,
where even a scientifically accessible argumentation exposes
the existence of stable and consistent human preferences as
a myth [12]. The problems of human rationality can not be
explained by bounded cognitive abilities only. ‘... people
argue that it is worth spending billions of pounds to improve
the safety of the rail system. However, the same people
habitually travel by car rather than by train, even though
traveling by car is approximately 30 times more dangerous
than by train!’[13, p.527–530] Since the last six decades
nevertheless, the common scientific standards for econometric
experiments are that subjects’ preferences over outcomes
can be insured by paying differing amounts of money [14].
However, insuring preferences by money is criticized by
tossing the term ‘Homo Economicus’ as well.
The ability of modeling other people’s rationality and
reasoning as well corresponds with the psychological term
‘Theory of Mind’ [15], which lacks almost only in the cases
of autism. For experimental economics, subjects as well as
researchers, who both are supposed to be non-autistic people,
may fail in modeling of others’ minds anyway. In Wason task
at least, subjects’ reasoning does not match the researchers’
one [16]. Human rationality is not restricted to capability for
science-grade logical reasoning – rational people may use no
logic at all [17]. However, people also make serious mistakes
in the calculus of probabilities [18]. Even in mixed strategy
games, where random behavior is of a huge advantage, the
required sequence of random decisions can not be properly
generated by people [19]. Due to bounded cognitive abilities,
every human ‘random’ decision depends on previous ones and
is predictable in this way. In ultimatum games [10, S. 43ff],
the former economists’ misconception of human preferences
is revealed – people’s minds value fairness additionally to
personal enrichment. Our minds originated from the time,
when private property had not been invented and social values
like fairness were essential for survival.
From the view point of data scientists fascinated by
human behavior, the sizes of datasets originated from social
networks predominate the ones from experimental economics
by orders of magnitude [10]. Nevertheless, analyzing data
from experimental economics has the same importance for
understanding human psychology as studying Escherichia for
understanding human physiology. Data from experimental
economics has the advantage of originating from simple and
controlled human interactions.
In current experimental economics, the models are first
constructed by philosophical plausibility considerations and
then are claimed to fit the data. In this work, we reverse
the order of common research in experimental economics.
We follow the slogan ‘existence precedes essence’ – the
philosophical plausibility considerations follow after the
correlations and regularities are found. For these needs,
we analyze the dataset of the paper “The Impact of Social
Comparisons on Reciprocity” by Ga¨chter et al. [20]. The only
assumption about human behavior is its determinism.
The next section summarizes related work on data mining
approaches and economical models. Then, the experiment
setup and the gathered data are introduced. Before extracting
rules of behavior, we explain the reasons for the assumption
of determinism. We also explain conceptual problems of using
linear model on this data. The results and their interpretations
follow afterwards. Then, a section is devoted to p-hacking. A
suggestion for more efficient research on human behavior is
made in future work. Summary and discussion conclude this
paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A similar approach is already explored on three datasets –
a zero-sum game of mixed strategies, an ultimatum game and
repeated social guessing game [21], [22]. For these datasets,
extracted deterministic regularities outperformed state-of-art
models. It was shown that some regularities can be easily
verbalized, what underlines their plausibility.
A very comprehensive gathering of works in experimental
psychology and economics on human behavior in general
games can be found in [23]. Quantal response equilibrium
became popular as a model for deviations from equilibria
[24]. It is a parametrized shift between mixed strategies
equilibrium and an equal distribution. The basic idea for
quantal response equilibrium is the concept of trembling
hand – people make mistakes with certain probability.
Unfortunately, the Akaike information criterion [25] is rarely
calculated to judge the trade-off between fit quality and
model complexity [26]. Another popular model is the linear
regression. It is used in the original paper to model the dataset
[20]. For linear regression, data is translated into real numbers.
III. GIFT-EXCHANGE-GAME
Since Akerloff and Yellen published their leading work
[27] on unemployment, gift-exchange-games (GEG) became
standard for modeling labor relations. Such a game involves
at least two players – an ‘employer’ and an ‘employee’. The
‘employer’ has to decide first, whether to award a higher salary
or not. Then, the ‘employee’ has to decide, whether to put
extra effort or not. Unfortunately, the experiment conducted
by Ga¨chter et al. did not implement a real-effort task. The
‘employee’ does not put real effort, but can decide to make
a gift, which reduces his/er own payoff. Nevertheless, this
game is not zero-sum. For what it’s worth, real-effort tasks are
already established in experimental economics – in works of
Ariely e.g. [28]. Therefore, we refuse to draw any inferences
from the behavior in the experiment to the behavior in real
labor relations. The ‘employer’ is renamed to originator and
‘employee’ to follower. If the originator and the follower are
both only interested in maximizing their payoff in a pure
monetary case and it is a one-shot game, the actual gift
exchange will not take place.
The experiment was conducted at University of Nottingham
and consisted of one-shot games, whereby no subject partici-
pated twice. The participants were 20 years old in average and
of both genders. Every one-shot game involves three players
– one originator and two followers. The originator has the
choice to award none, one or both followers. The followers
have four levels of rewarding (including non-rewarding) the
originator. In the original game description, the originator and
every follower have to give at least a minimum gift, which we
denote non-gift for simplicity. At the beginning, the originator
gets £8.3 and every follower gets £11.1. The additional payoff
of the originator is the sum of margins from gift exchange with
both followers. The additional payoff of every follower is the
gift of the originator minus reduction through own gifts. The
originator can give a fixed amount of £1.6 to a follower. A
follower can give £1, £2 or £3, whereby his/er payoff reduces
by £0.5, £1 or £1.5 accordingly.
We split the 3-players game into two 2-players games. Fig.1
shows the 2-players game between an originator and a follower
in extensive form. Extensive form is known in AI as game tree.
The originator has to decide for two of such 2-players games.
After the originator makes his choice, the followers make their
choices either sequentially or simultaneously. Every follower
can observe both of originators’ decisions. In the sequential
case, first follower’s decision can be seen by the second
follower. Besides mutual visibility, both 2-players games are
independent. Adding both games, the originator’s total payoff
ranges between £5.1 and £14.3. The follower’s total payoff
ranges between £9.6 and £12.7.
0
Originator
1.63
(3,−1.5)
0
(0,0)
Follower
2
(2,−1)
1
(1,−.5)
3
(1.4, .1)
0
(−1.6,1.6)
Follower
2
(.4, .6)
1
(−.6,1.1)
Fig. 1. Experimental non-zero-sum 2-players GEG in extensive form.
(Originator’s payoff, Follower’s payoff) – payoffs are in £. Payoff maximizing
equilibrium is marked by dashed lines.
IV. DATASET
123 subjects participated in the game – 84 for the
sequential case and 39 for the simultaneous case. 1233 = 41
originators have made 41× 2 = 82 decisions – two 2-players
games per originator. The follower were asked to submit
their decisions for every possible combination of others’
observable decisions. There are 4 decision combinations for
an originator. First followers in the sequential case submitted
4 ∗ 843 = 112 and all followers in the simultaneous case
submitted 4 ∗ 2 ∗ 393 = 104 decisions. Second followers in
the sequential case submitted 4 ∗ 4 ∗ 843 = 448 decisions.
Therefore, we have a dataset of total 746 human decisions.
V. ASSUMPTION OF DETERMINISM
Modeling human behavior outside of game playing with
human subjects should not be confused with prediction
algorithms of artificial players. Quite the contrary, artificial
players can manipulate the predictability of human subjects by
own behavior. For instance, an artificial player, which always
throws ‘stone’ in roshambo, would success at predicting
a human opponent always throwing ‘paper’ in reaction.
Otherwise, if an artificial player maximizes its payoff based
on opponent modeling, it would face a change in human
behavior and have to deal with it. This case is more complex
than a spectator prediction model for an ‘only-humans’
interaction. This work is restricted on modeling behavior
without participating.
Human behavior can be modeled as either deterministic or
non-deterministic. Although human subjects fail at generating
truly random sequences as demanded by mixed strategies
equilibrium, non-deterministic models are especially used in
case of artificial players in order to handle uncertainties.
‘Specifically, people are poor at being random and poor at
learning optimal move probabilities because they are instead
trying to detect and exploit sequential dependencies. ... After
all, even if people don’t process game information in the
manner suggested by the game theory player model, it may
still be the case that across time and across individuals,
human game playing can legitimately be viewed as (pseudo)
randomly emitting moves according to certain probabilities.’
[29] In the addressed case of spectator prediction models, non-
deterministic view can be regarded as too shallow, because
deterministic models allow much more exact predictions.
Non-deterministic models are only useful in cases, where
a proper clarification of uncertainties is either impossible
or costly. To remind, deterministic models should not be
considered to obligatory have a formal logic shape.
VI. NOMINAL, ORDINAL OR NUMERIC
The usage of right data types is essential for correct
data analysis. There are basically three categories, in which
variables can be classified – nominal, ordinal and numeric.
Nominal variables assume values from a finite set, which has
no order. Ordinal variables are like nominals plus ordering
relationship over the set of values. Numeric variables assume
real numbers R as values. Ordinal values can be projected
into numeric under assumption about their distribution over
the number axis. In contrast, nominal values can not.
Some variables, which impact human actions, are actions
of other players. Since presuming human preferences over
the outcomes has no base, an ordering relationship over
the actions can not be presumed as well. In the addressed
problem, all variables impacting human actions are actions
of others. Preferences over outcomes in the earlier described
GEG can not be presumed. For instance, the outcomes (.4, .6)
and (1.4, .1) (Fig.1) are the total payoffs (£8.7,£11.7) and
(£9.7,£11.2). An egoistic follower would prefer the first
and altruistic one the second. Since the variables have to
be nominal and not even ordinal, they can not be projected
into real numbers. An application of a linear model as in the
original paper [20] becomes therefore nonsense for this data.
VII. RESULTS
Originator’s both decisions are nominal or rather boolean
– it is either a gift or not. In average, originators gift in
36.6% of samples. We calculate Kappa [30], [31] to measure
the inter-rater agreement between these two decisions. Having
zero Kappa as null hypothesis, the significance of the
measured Kappa can be calculated. Tab.I displays significant
fair agreement between originator’s both decisions in the
sequential case. There is no significant agreement between
them in the simultaneous case. Unfortunately, the data is too
marginal and Fisher’s test [32] does not show any significant
difference between the frequencies in both cases – p-value
is 0.4686. We can at least claim that both decisions are
dependent in the sequential case.
Tab.II shows absolute statistics for the follower’s
decisions, which did not observe another follower. Besides
own received gift, there is the gift received by the other
follower, which might have an impact on the observing
follower’s decision. If no own gift is received in the
simultaneous case, Fisher’s test results a p-value of 0.0496 for
gifting >£0 depending on whether or not the other follower
received a gift. Receiving less than the other follower is
therefore significantly reciprocated in the simultaneous case
only. The significance of this result is thoroughly discussed
TABLE I. ORIGINATOR’S TWO DECISIONS – ABSOLUTE STATISTICS
AND AGREEMENTS.
Sequential Simultaneous Sum
Gifts for 1st 9 6 15
Gifts for 2nd 10 5 15
All samples 28 13 41
Kappa .4432 .2169 .3692
p-value .017 .22 .014
TABLE II. FOLLOWER’S DECISION WITHOUT OBSERVING ANOTHER
FOLLOWER’S DECISION – ABSOLUTE STATISTICS.
Sequential Simultaneous
Own gift £0 £1 £2 £3 £0 £1 £2 £3
Received gifts
Own Other’s
£0 £0 21 6 1 0 19 7 0 0
£0 £1.6 21 6 1 0 25 0 1 0
£1.6 £0 13 6 5 4 16 6 4 0
£1.6 £1.6 13 6 4 5 16 3 4 3
in section VIII. In the sequential case, there is no significant
difference between decision frequencies depending on the
other’s received gift. Obviously, the order between the
follower delivers a reason for an unequal treatment.
Tab.III lists agreements as well as their significances
between subsets of own decisions and observed decisions.
The subsets of own decisions are defined by thresholds on gift
size. We use thresholds to define subsets, because based on
decreasing frequencies by raising gift size (Tab.II), an order
on the gift decisions can be derived. One can see that only
own received gift has a significant influence on own decision
in sequential as well as in simultaneous cases. Since only one
variable has influence on the decision, the deterministic model
is trivial – gift >£0 in the sequential case having received a
gift, non-gift anywhere else.
As Fig.2 shows, non-gift covers ≥ 50% of decisions for
the second follower for all possible combinations of input
variables and 71.2% in average. One can of cause assume
that some hidden variables influence the gift decision. Since
we do not see these variables, we can not build a useful
valid deterministic model – none can be better than the null
hypothesis suggesting non-gift everywhere. We restrict the
analysis to agreements between the decision and the three
observed variables.
Tab.IV shows the agreements between subsets of the
TABLE III. FOLLOWER’S DECISION WITHOUT OBSERVING ANOTHER
FOLLOWER’S DECISION – AGREEMENTS WITH ORIGINATOR’S DECISIONS.
.......Sequential....... Simultaneous
Kappa p-value Kappa p-value
Own gift ... ... vs. received gift
>£0 .2857 .0012 .2308 .0093
>£1 .2857 .0012 .1923 .0249
>£2 .1607 .045 .0577 .2781
... vs. other’s received gift
>£0 0 .5
<£1 .1154 .1197
>£1 0 .5 .0769 .2164
>£2 .0179 .4251 .0577 .2781
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Fig. 2. Choice of the second follower – absolute statistics depending on
other players’ decisions encoded on x-axis as: other follower’s received, own
received and other follower’s given. N is £0 and Y £1.6.
TABLE IV. SECOND FOLLOWER’S DECISION – AGREEMENTS.
Sequential case
Kappa p-value
Own gift ... ... vs. received gift
>£0 .0223 .3183
>£1 .0223 .3183
>£2 .0134 .3884
... vs. other’s received gift
>£0 .0045 .4624
>£1 .0402 .1975
>£2 .0134 .3884
... vs. other’s gift
.0446 .0509
second follower’s decisions and the decisions of the originator
– none of them is significant. It also shows the agreement
between the decisions of the first and the second follower,
whereby correspondence between the values’ sets of both
variables is assumed. This agreement is not significant.
Therefore, the value sets of both variables have to be
transformed. Tab.V shows agreements between both variables
transformed to booleans in different combinations. The
highest agreement and the lowest p-value are achieved for the
first follower’s gift >£1 and the second one’s >£0. Once the
first follower is extra generous, the second one is also driven
to gift the originator.
To summarize, the frequency of non-gift is 63.4% for the
originator, 60.7% for the first sequential follower, 73% for the
TABLE V. FIRST AND SECOND FOLLOWER’S DECISION –
AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SUBSETS.
1st follower >£0 >£1 >£2
Kappa p-value Kappa p-value Kappa p-value
2nd follower
>£0 .1123 .0016 .2634 1.238e−8 .1445 .0068
>£1 .0564 .0365 .1563 .0005 .1345 .029
>£2 .026 .1826 .0759 .0541 .0456 .2789
simultaneous follower and 71.2% for the second sequential
follower. According to Fisher test, none of these frequencies
significantly deviates from the rest. The average non-gift
frequency is 69%.
VIII. ON P-HACKING
It is not a secret that p-values closely under 0.05 cause
suspicion about the scientific methods used in research [33].
Although p-value was never thought to be an objective
criterion for proof or disproof of a hypothesis, many
researchers misunderstand it and conduct the so called
’p-hacking’ on the data to archive significant results.
The results achieved through p-hacking might not be
reproducible, since the a-priori probabilities of the hypotheses
have to be incorporated as well. For instance, if the hypothesis
is a long shot and has an a-priori probability of 5%, a p-value
of 0.01 raises the chance of its validity to only 30%. The more
hypotheses are tested on p-value, the higher the probability
to achieve a p-value under 0.05. Obviously, the difference
between long shots and good bets has to be derived from the
researcher’s expert knowledge, which is known to be absent
in the case of an pure data scientist analyzing human data.
Here, we suggest the data scientist to be ’agnostic’ and use
some background knowledge to advocate the result.
During the data analysis in this paper, we got a p-
value of 0.0496 for the hypothesis that an unfairly treated
simultaneous follower negatively reciprocates. Using the
background knowledge about human reaction to unfairness
[34], we can assume that it is a good bet. If the a-priori
probability for a good bet is assumed to be about 90%, a
p-value of 0.05% raises its chance of validity to 96%.
IX. FUTURE WORK
During the work on this paper, we confronted the time
consuming requesting, selection and reformatting of data.
Unfortunately, there is no online portal, where most of the
datasets are offered in a common format. This is an issue,
which we will address in the future. Like in the field of
bioinformatics, common formats are an important part of an
interdisciplinary research infrastructure and are needed to
accelerate the progress [35].
As for methodological aspects of Machine Learning in
the context of Experimental Economics, we would like to use
the advanced pattern mining techniques for economic game
data analyses. For example, in papers [36], [37] was made an
attempt to use sequential patterns and similarity dependencies
on pattern structures for video game players’ behavior
analysis, in particular sequential attribute dependencies might
be a tool of choice. We will try to apply sequential pattern
mining in a supervised task, where the outcome of a game
(or a turn) is a target attribute [38], [39] to see which patterns
better generalize the user behavior. These experiments are
able not only to broad the tools of experimental economics,
but also help to reveal potentially new knowledge of human
behavior in games based on sequential pattern description.
X. CONCLUSION
First of all, the average non-gift frequency is only 69%
in the studied one shot GEG. These are far away from the
100%, which an egoistic payoff maximization assumption
would predict. But, it is also over 50% in almost all cases.
There, it is impossible to create valid nontrivial deterministic
models of human behavior without having access to the
hidden variables, which determine the choice. Only if the first
follower receives a gift in the sequential case, the frequency
of gifts goes slightly over 50%.
Although first follower’s decision depends only on his
received gift and second follower’s decision does not depend
on originators’ decisions at all, originators’ decisions are
interdependent in the sequential case. The order between the
players obviously delivers a reason for the first follower to not
mind differences in gifts. Having no order in the simultaneous
case leads to significant negative reciprocation of receiving
less than the second follower.
A curious finding is that not minimal but extra generosity
is ’contagious’ for the followers. Second follower reacts only
on the first follower being extra generous and with normal
generosity.
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